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Jehovah's Witnesses
This verse has become a
favorite of Jehovah's Witnesses and others who deny the Trinity.
They claim that since Jesus says that the Father is the only true God,
Jesus cannot also be the only true God.
Jehovah's Witness Greg
Stafford, for example, writes:
Jehovah's Witnesses believe
the Bible presents us with a monotheistic view of God, in that He is the
only one who is God in the absolute (non-derived) sense.
The Father is the only true God, as Jesus said. (Joh 17:3)
The description "true God" is used only three times in the NT.
In all three of these texts Jesus is distinguished from the true God.
In John 17:3 he prays to the "only" true God....This is
significant in that there is no clear indication of Jesus as this
"true God" in the Bible, which would stand to reason in view
of the restriction he himself places on this title in the NT (Stafford,
pp. 119-120).
Trinitarians have often
responded that if the Father is the only true
God, and the Watchtower is correct in saying that Jesus is "a
god," then Jesus must be a false God, for anything that is not true,
must be false. Greg Stafford cites such an argument presented by Ron
Rhodes (Reasoning from the Scriptures with Jehovah's Witnesses, pp.
227-228). Stafford responds:
The Greek word translated
"true" (alethinos) can have one of several meanings, depending
on the context and usage of the author or speaker. According to
BAGD [the Baur, Arndt, Gingrich, and Danker lexicon], alethinos can
mean: "genuine, real . . . Of God in contrast to other gods, who
are not real . . . true in the sense of the reality possessed only by
the archetype, not by its copies" (Stafford, op. cit., p.
121).
Are Jehovah's Witnesses right?
Is Jesus really saying that only one Person - the Father - is the true
God? Are the Witnesses using sound exegetical principles in defining
alethinos the way they do? Let's examine this verse closely
to find out.
The Only True God
Had Jesus said, "Only you,
Father, are the true God," He would, indeed, be proclaiming what the
Watchtower says. However, that's not precisely what Jesus said.
He said to the Father, "you, the only true God." The word
"only" does not modify "Father," but rather
"God." Does this fact change the meaning of the what Jesus
is saying? Stafford reasons:
While in certain contexts the
word "only" might not mean only in the absolute sense,
there is no indication that we have such use here in John 17:3.
Also, there is no example that I am aware of where the person who makes
the assertion that another person is the "only" something,
means to include him- or herself in the description. (IBID, p. 120).
But is there a subtle
presupposition in this line of reasoning? I would submit there is:
The presupposition is that the person in question is a unipersonal being.
That is, human nature is such that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between Person (or Identity, Consciousness, or Will) and Being (the
essence or nature that makes a human, human); therefore, any example of a
human person saying that that another person is the "only"
something, indeed does not mean to include him- or herself in the
description. But what if there is Biblical evidence of a Being that
subsists in more that one person - a multi-personal being? If such a
Being exists (and Trinitarians believe the Bible teaches that God is such
a Being), it must be admitted that each Person of a multi-personal Being
can be described as the "only" something, without necessarily
excluding other Persons of that Being from that description. Put
another way, Jesus includes the Father in the identity of the True God.
However, if Jesus is the same Being as the Father, He does not logically
exclude Himself from that category. Indeed, it is logically
fallacious to claim that He does (1).
Witnesses who argue as Stafford
does deny the possibility of a multipersonal God from the outset.
They therefore place considerable emphasis on their preferred definition
of "true," for without it, they would be forced to concede that
the Son is a false god. However, we may ask how it is that John 17:3
excludes Jesus from the category of "true" God, when Jude 4 does
not exclude the Father from the category of Lord? Indeed, here,
there is not even the qualifying adjective that provides the basis of the Witness
interpretation of John 17:3. Matthew 19:17 presents Witnesses with a
similar problem, for here Jesus says that there is only "One"
who is good; Witnesses must interpret this to mean that Jesus in His
humility is denying His own goodness (or, at least, is not "as good
as God," though this distinction is not to be found in the context). In practice, Witnesses
acknowledge Jesus as "good," and Jehovah as their Lord.
Their exegetical methodology appears inconsistent and subject to their
theology; whereas Trinitarians are consistent in holding that an exclusive
title may be given to any member of the Trinity, without excluding other
members from that category.
More importantly, Stafford and
the WT cannot interpret verses like John 5:44, 1 Timothy 1:17, or Jude 25,
in which we find the phrase "[the] only God," without
introducing the concept "God in a non-derived sense" - that is,
that Jehovah is the "only God" in the sense that He is the only
true or non-derived God. However, this sense is foreign to the
contexts of these verses and requires Witnesses to bring other verse, such
as John 17:3, into the discussion, which they interpret in ways conducive
to their theology. As we shall see, John 17:3 does not really
support the idea of a "non-derived" God, at least not in the
view of most lexicographers. When Scripture makes a clear
declaration that there is only one God, the burden lies with any who would
argue otherwise.
Only if one assumes before
hand that God is unipersonal can one conclude that John
17:3 proves that only the Father is true God. Notice how the quoted passage
from Stafford, above, begins with the premise, "Jehovah's Witnesses
believe the Bible presents us with a monotheistic view of God, in that He
is the only one who is God in the absolute (non-derived)
sense." He would no doubt say that the WT derives this belief
from the passages he cites; however, in each case - and particularly John
17:3 - only by assuming a unipersonal God can one conclude that the Father
is the only Person who is that true God.
Thus, the Watchtower and its
apologists are guilty of "begging the question" with regard to
John 17:3, for only by first assuming that God is one Person, can they
"prove" by this verse that Jesus calls the Father the only
Person who is God.
Interestingly, Stafford accuses
Trinitarians of this very fallacy: Trinitarians, he says,
"import their ideas into the Bible, making it practically impossible
for them to view theological or christological statements apart from
Trinitarian concepts" (IBID, p. 129). In the case of John 17:3,
I believe the opposite is actually the case. It is Jehovah's
Witnesses who import their Unitarian view of God, while Trinitarians draw
no specific conclusions regarding God's nature from this verse.
Let's be clear:
Trinitarians do not claim that John 17:3 "proves" the Trinity;
we simply maintain that scripturally and logically, it does not deny it.
The Meaning of
"True"
We may first note that in
English, the word "true" may mean "real, in the sense of an
archetype, as distinguished from a copy" or "true contrasted
with false." Alêthinos has the very much the same
semantic range in Koine Greek, as BAGD makes clear (p. 37). The
question is, which connotation does Jesus intend here? Extending the
meaning of a word beyond that required by the context is not a sound
exegetical practice. After all, the word "true" has within
its semantic range the connotation of "straight," but Jesus is
not saying the Father is the only straight-line God!
Which connotation do the
lexicons support for alêthinos in John 17:3? After all,
Watchtower apologists have used BAGD and Thayer to support their view,
haven't they? BAGD recognizes the semantic range of alêthinos
as containing "true in the sense of reality possessed only by an
archetype, not its copies." However, it references this shade
of meaning for Hebrews 8:2 and 9:24, not in
reference to John 17:3. When we consult the lexicon with
regard John 17:3, BAGD is quite clear: "of God in contrast to
other gods, who are not real." Thus, BAGD recognizes the
context of John 17:3 as requiring the "true contrasted with
false" connotation.
Stafford notes:
"While BAGD does not attribute the archetypal meaning to alethinos
in John 17:3, we believe this sense best fits the use of 'true' in this
and other passages" (IBID, p. 121). He then argues for this
connotation in John 17:3 by citing John 1:9, John 6:32-33, Hebrews 8:5,
and Hebrews 9:9 (sic; 9:24?). "In all these texts,
alethinos is not contrasted with something 'false,' but is used to
describe that which is the archetype as opposed to that which is a copy
of the original" (IBID).
Stafford is quite right about
the verses he cites, and interestingly, BAGD references these as well for
the archetype connotation. This means that BAGD was fully
aware that the verses in question supported the archetypal connotation,
and yet believed the "true vs false" connotation applied to John
17:3. Stafford offers no reason why we should consider the archetype
connotation in this verse; he merely asserts that Witnesses hold this
view. Further, he considers BAGD authoritative
with regard to the connotation of alêthinos he prefers, but does
not tell us why he considers them unable to distinguish the proper connotation
for John 17:3. It is possible, of course, that the authors got it
right in the first case and wrong in the second, but without evidence to
demonstrate why their authority should be questioned, we must conclude
that Greek scholars who are capable of ascertaining the various
connotations of a particular word must also be capable of determining
specific usage in a given context.
We may wonder why the authors
of BAGD chose the particular connotation they did in John 17:3.
Let's take a look at the context of the verses in discussion. In
Hebrews 8:2 and 9:24, the writer is clearly referring to the "true
Tabernacle" in heaven where Jesus is the High Priest, in contrast to
the earthly (and less "real") Tabernacle. However, in
context, John 17:3 does not imply a contrast between Jesus and God.
Instead, the context is Jesus' concern that the disciples know the Father
in an intimate way, that they may thus obtain eternal life. For who
gives eternal life, but the true God (as contrasted with false gods)?
Thus, context argues for the connotation of "the true God" who
give eternal life, as opposed to "false gods," who cannot.
If BAGD is reliable in both
their understanding of the various connotation of alêthinos and
their specific definition in John 17:3, we would expect that other
authorities would corroborate it. Similarly, if BAGD got it wrong
with regard to John 17:3, we would expect other authorities to disagree.
Grimm/Thayer defines alêthinos
as "contrasts realities with their semblances" for Hebrews 8:2
and 9:24, but "opposed to what is fictitious, counterfeit, imaginary,
simulated, pretended" for John 17:3 (p. 27). So, Grimm/Thayer,
too, recognizes the correct connotation of alêthinos in John 17:3
as "true contrasted with false."
In his Expository
Dictionary, Vine recognizes Hebrews 8:2 and 9:24 as requiring the
meaning: "the spiritual, archetypal tabernacle," but defines alêthinos
in John 17:3 as: "'very God,' in distinction from all other gods,
false gods" (p. 645).
Louw and Nida similarly
recognize several connotations for alêthinos, including those
discussed. They define alêthinos in John 17:3 as:
"pertaining to being real and not imaginary ... 'that they may know
you, the only one who is really God'" (p. 667).
Moulton
and Milligan list a number of contemporary extra-biblical examples of alêthinos,
including several by Christians in reference to God, and all carry the
meaning 'real'; 'genuine'; 'true, as opposed to false' (p. 22).
Finally, the Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament (TDNT) does not specifically reference
John 17:3 in its discussion of alêthinos, but says "As a
divine attribute it has the sense of 'reliable,' 'righteous,' or
'real,'" and cites 1 John 5:20, a verse Stafford relates to John 17:3
(IBID, p. 120). This meaning is contrasted with the archetype
connotation: "In Heb 8:2 the heavenly tabernacle is 'true' in
contrast to the earthly, and in Heb. 9:24 the human sanctuary is a copy of
the true one, which is genuine as divine" (Abridged edition, p. 39).
So, we see that the standard
lexical works specify the connotation of alêthinos in John 17:3 as
"the only true God (as distinguished from all other gods, who are
false)." This definition of alêthinos presents serious
problems for Watchtower theology, for by saying "the only true
God," Jesus states quite clearly that any other who is termed "a
god," must be a false god.
Origen's Understanding of the True God
Stafford cites Origen in
support of his view that alêthinos in John 17:3 should be read
with the archetype connotation:
In
his Commentary on John he wrote:
God
on the one hand is Very God (Autotheos, God of Himself); and so the Savior
says in His prayer to the Father, "That they may know Thee the only
true God;" but that all beyond the Very God is made God by
participation in His divinity, and is not to be called simply God
(with the article), but rather God (without the article). And
thus the first-born of all creation, who is the first to be with God, and
to attract to himself divinity, is a being of more exalted rank than the
other gods beside Him, of whom God is the God, as it is written,
"The God of gods, the Lord [Jehovah], hath spoken and called the
earth." [Ps. 136:2] It was by the offices of the first-born
that they became gods, for they drew from God in generous measure that
they should be made gods, and He communicated it to them according to His
own bounty. The true God, then is "The God," and those
who are formed after him are gods, images, as it were, of Him the
prototype [ANF 10, Book 2, p. 323. emphasis added].
Origen
evidently understood that the reference to the Word as theos was not
intended to make him equal to God the Father, for he wrote: "Nor must
we omit to mention the Word, who is God after [hexes] the Father of
all" (IBID, pp. 120-121).
Origen's
theology is complex, to say the least. Drawing conclusions from a
few scattered passages does little justice to what Origen actually taught,
and what his terminology meant to his contemporaries, as opposed to what
it may be thought to signify today, looking back as it were through the
lens of the Arian controversy which raged some hundred years after Origen
died. Stafford is correct that Origen
does appear to apply the archetype connotation to alêthinos in his
Commentary on John 1:1. But we may ask exactly what does Origen mean
by this usage? Is it the same as that expressed by Stafford and the
Watchtower? What may have led him to view the "true" God
in an archetypal way? Finally, we must also consider whether Origen
bases his view of alêthinos on grammar or on theology.
Let's first consider what
Origen means by the "true God." It would be a mistake to read a post-Arian meaning into
Origen's use of autotheos or the distinction his draws between theos
with the article and without. In terming the Father autotheos,
Origen does not mean that the Father possesses a "true" divine
nature, and the Son a "lesser" divine nature. Origen
taught that the "begetting" of the Son by the Father
cannot be compared to human begetting (First Principles 1:2:4), that the Son and Father share
the same nature (Commentary on John 2:2:16; 2:10:76; 19:2:6;), and that there was never a time when the Son did not
exist (Commentary on Romans 1:5; First Principles 1:2:9; 4:4:1 in both
Rufinus' Latin translation and Athanasius' Greek). The begetting of the Son is a part of the Divine
Being and is from all eternity (First Principles, 1:2:9; 4:41, again in
both Rufinus and Athanasius) and is also continual (Homily on Jeremiah
9:4);
the Father is the "source" of divinity, and the Son
"attracts" that same divinity to Himself through his eternal contemplation
of the Father (Commentary on John 2:2:18). (2)
It is true that for Origen, the
Son's Deity is derivative, and at times speaks of the Son as a
"secondary God (Against Celsus 5:39; Commentary on John 6:39:202);
but it is also true that Origen was strongly influenced by Middle
Platonism in this regard, as numerous scholars have recognized:
"The parallel with Albinus,
who believed in a supreme Father Who organized matter through a second God
(Whom he, however, identified with the World Soul) is striking; as is the
fact that both thinkers envisaged the generation of the Son as the result
of His contemplation of the Father" (Kelly,
p. 128).
"In a more limited field
the impact of Platonism reveals itself in the thoroughgoing
subordinationism which is is integral to Origen's Trinitarian
scheme. The Father, as we have seen, is alone autoqeos,
so S. John, he points out, accurately describes the Son simple as qeos,
not ó qeos" (Ibid., pp. 131
- 32).
"Thus, Origen understands
that the Word is God by derivation....Here Origen is directly indebted to
the Platonism of his day" (Rusch,
p. 14)
"This distinction also has
its origin in Philo (quod a deo somnia, Mangey 1.655 line 20), and
it is again Origen who takes it up and imports it into Christian
theology" (Prestige, p.
144).
Origen's apologetic arguments
against Gnosticism and Modalism, in which he sought
forcefully to affirm the true
Human nature of the Son and the distinction between Father, Son, and
Spirit, and his use of Platonic concepts and language, have led some to
conclude, as apparently has Stafford, that Origen taught that the Son was
different in nature from the Father, truly a "second god" in the
sense later argued by Arius. However, a careful reading of Origen
leads one to conclude that while complex and couched in philosophical terminology,
Origen taught the essential unity of Father and Son in categories not
incompatible with later creedal statements. Indeed, this can be seen
in the passage from the Commentary on John, which Stafford quotes,
above.
Immediately preceding the quote
provided by Stafford, we read:
Now there are many who are
sincerely concerned about religion, and who fall here into great
perplexity. They are afraid that they may be proclaiming two Gods, and
their fear drives them into doctrines which are false and wicked. Either
they deny that the Son has a distinct nature of His own besides that of
the Father, and make Him whom they call the Son to be God all but the
name, or they deny the divinity of the Son, giving Him a separate
existence of His own, and making His sphere of essence fall outside that
of the Father, so that they are separable from each other (Commentary
on John 2:2:10-13).
Thus, the Son is distinct in
person, but of one "essence" with the Father. For Origen,
though he may speak at times of "a secondary God," he is also
quite comfortable speaking of Father, Son, and Spirit as One God. In
his Dialog with Heraclides, Origen refers to Scripture in order to show in
what sense two can be one:
- Adam and Eve were two but one flesh (Gen. 2:24).
- He (the just man) who is joined to the Lord is one spirit with Him (Cor.
6:17).
- He introduces Christ himself as a witness because He said: "I
and My Father are one."
In the first example, the unity consisted of "flesh;" in the
second of "spirit;" but in the third of "God."
Thus Origen states: "Our Lord and Savior is in His relation to the
Father and God of the universe not one flesh, nor one spirit, but what is
much higher than flesh and spirit, one God" (Dialog with Heraclides
2).
Thus, when Origen says that the "Word is God after the
Father of all," he is not teaching an inequality of nature or
essence, as Stafford implies.
Immediately after Stafford's
quote, we find:
But
the archetypal image, again, of all these images is the Word of God, who
was in the beginning, and who by being with God is at all times God, not
possessing that of Himself, but by His being with the Father, and not
continuing to be God, if we should think of this, except by remaining
always in uninterrupted contemplation of the depths of the Father
(Commentary on John 2:2:18).
For
Origen, then, while the other 'gods' are "images" of the true
God, the Son is not in their category of being. He obtains
His divine Nature by always being with the Father, while the other 'gods'
are "formed" - that is created - and they derive their divinity
from the Son. While some have argued that Origen refers to the Son
as a created being in his reference to Colossians 1:15 (First Principles
1:2), this language should not be pressed, since Origen used the term
KTISIS to refer to all the activities of God, including the eternal
begetting of the Son, and therefore is not to be construed as signifying
that the Son is a created being.
Contrary to what Arianism was
to say, the eternity of this generation is clearly affirmed, for it is
inconceivable that the Father ever existed without his Wisdom, his
Reason, his Word, all expressions which, as we have seen, denote the
Son. Nor did the Father begin to be Father, as if He had not been
so before, since all change in God is inconceivable (Crouzel, pp.
186-187).
While Origen uses the term alêthinos
in a manner similar to that suggested by Stafford, it is because he viewed
God as the 'source' of Deity, while the Son eternally partakes of that
same Deity. Origen's use of middle Platonic thought and language led
him to express the relationship of Father to Son in such terms. It
must be emphasized the Origen's use of alêthinos is theological,
not lexical. Origen's language and philosophical constructs are
other than those used by later theologians to describe the Trinity (as
they are from those preceding him), but his theology is not far distant
from them, certainly not as far as it is from the theology later proposed
by Arius and his followers. He taught plurality within the unity of
the Godhead; He perceived the Godhead to be Father, Son, and Spirit, each
of whom participated in creation and participate in salvation.
Conclusion
If God is unipersonal, this
verse does not teach it. If a lesser "copy" of God is not
a false god, the context of this verse does not demonstrate it.
Jesus says that eternal life is an intimate personal knowledge of God (not
"taking in knowledge about God," as the Watchtower teaches), and
of Jesus Christ, whom the Father has sent. Our hope for eternal
life, then, resides in knowing both the Father and the Son in a personal
way, and knowing them as they truly are: One God, One Lord, One
Savior.
___________________
Notes
1.
In fact, the entire argument that Jesus cannot be the true God based on
John 17:3 is an example of a logical fallacy known as "denying the
antecedent." To illustrate this point, let's rephrase John
17:3b in the form of a logical proposition:
If one is the
Father, one is the only true God.
"If one is
the Father" is the antecedent of the proposition. "One is
the only true God" is the consequent. In the terms of formal
logic, it is not logically valid to deny the antecedent, and conclude that
the consequent is also denied. For example, consider the following
proposition:
If one is a
man, one is mortal.
Now, consider
the denial of the antecedent:
Fido is not a
man, therefore Fido is not mortal.
Clearly, since
(sadly for dog lovers) dogs do not live forever, denying the antecedent
does not prove that the consequent must also be denied. Technically
speaking, if one is a man, that is sufficient cause for the
conclusion that one is mortal. However, if one is mortal, that is
not a necessary cause that one is a man. There are numerous
other mortal creatures, including man's best friend. From
the standpoint of pure logic, then, it is not valid to argue that because
Jesus is not the Father (denying the antecedent in our paraphrased
proposition) He cannot be the only true God. Being the Father is
sufficient cause for being the only true God; however, being the only true God is
not a necessary cause for being the Father. Some
may object at this point that in our canine example, we do not have the
restricted language of John 17:3b ("the only true God").
However, while placing "only" before the antecedent can have the
effect of making the antecedent both sufficient and necessary, placing
"only" before the consequent (as it is in John 17:3b) does
not. That is, in logical terms, affirming that the Father is the
true God is the same as affirming that He is the only true
God. The antecedent, in either case, is sufficient, but not
necessary. 2.
Much has been made of the fact that large portions of Origen's writing is
preserved only in Latin translations by Rufinus and Jerome. Rufinus,
in his preface to the Treatise of First Principles, states that he
suppressed some passages on the Trinity which he judged to be inserted by
heretics. Jehovah's Witness apologists, when confronted by the
quotations I have provided here often reply that we cannot be certain that
they reflect Origen's beliefs, but rather are interpolations by Rufinus.
First, this objection cannot be raised with regard to the Commentary on
the Gospel of John or the Homily 9 on Jeremiah, since we
possess the Greek text of the books quoted. The passages
quoted from First Principles exist both in Rufinus' Latin
and Athanasius' Greek. There is no evidence that these two witnesses
are related; therefore, we have two independent sources suggesting that
these quotes accurately reflect Origen's original words. As Henri
Crouzel notes, Rufinus' translation suffers primarily from omissions,
often arising from a desire to abridge or avoid repetition:
"Comparisons of the texts in the Philocalia [containing about
1/7 of the Greek text of First Principles] with Rufinus' work
yields on the whole a favorable result" (Crouzel,
pp. 46-47). Any discrepancies between Rufinus' Latin and Origen's
Greek would, then, seem to be in the area of omissions rather than
interpolations, and the extent to which Rufinus altered the text has,
perhaps, been exaggerated by some. Thus, we have several works, some
preserved in Greek, others in Latin but corroborated by independent Greek
witnesses, which demonstrate that Origen held the belief that the Son was
of the same essence as the Father, co-eternal and uncreated. |